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Abstract
In looking toward the futures of Europe, the focal point of the legal and governmental aspects of
European life has recently become the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe—or just the
‘Constitution’ as it has become colloquially known. That socio-linguistic act of referring to a
document as a constitution is a mammoth move. First, it ignores all of the concerns and hand-
wringing around the idea of producing a legal document called a constitution that might immediately
be thought of as a sovereign-building document, such as the German constitution or the Irish
constitution. Second, it suggests that the people of Europe are in some way similarly situated as
together to constitute something. In this article, the author continues a series of reflections on words
regarding futures, and takes an extensive look at the use, misuse and power of the word
‘constitution’.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Deduction or induction?
Without claiming any causal connection, there seems to be among the peoples of the
English language tradition, a discernible preference for induction as a fundamental
thought force in a variety of areas, most notably law and perhaps philosophy as well. Thus,
one finds, for example, the common law process of inducing a rule of law from a progeny
of cases (or even a constitution from a series of legal documents, as is the case in the UK),
the scientific process of inducing a rule of science from empirical experiments, and the
linguistic process of inducing word meanings from usage, as found in the standard-bearing
reference source, the Oxford English Dictionary. In contrast, on the European continent
deduction is more often the norm, as evidenced by the Roman law process of deducing a
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K.W. Junker / Futures 38 (2006) 224–233 225empiricism in philosophy and science, and by the Gesellschaft fu¨r Deutsche Sprache
(Society for the German Language or G.D.S.), Academie Francais and other such
language institutions as they police denotations and connotations from the top down.
For example, the G.D.S. in Wiesbaden, Germany annually chooses an Unwort des
Jahres or ‘non-word of the year’. Perhaps not as strident as the Academie Francais in
Paris, and received by the German public largely as entertainment, the non-word is
nevertheless a rather earnest public exercise by the G.D.S. and represents one of its minor
gatekeeping functions to the culture. The G.D.S. selection for 2004, for example, was
‘Hartz IV’ in reference to the much maligned German employment and job market plan.
Unlike Time magazine’s ‘man of the year’, which Time claims to base upon what it
perceives to be total impact on the world, positive or negative, thus having Adolf Hitler
and Josef Stalin among its past selections, the G.D.S. selection is clearly understood to be a
word with a negative impact. In a way that perhaps reflects the internal foci of individual
European countries on their own individual cultures and languages, ‘Hartz IV’ was no
surprise for Germany. But if we were to combine Time’s suggestion of looking to total
impact, positive or negative, with the G.D.S.’ focus on a word (not a human then), a
European, rather than a German or a Frenchman or a Latvian might well have selected the
word ‘constitution’ for 2004.1
If one looks to the frequency of use and discussion, the impact of ‘constitution’ in
2004 demonstrated its impact beginning with resilient ruminations during the December
2003–January 2004 break after the failed vote in favour of a ‘Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe’ in Rome in December. At the conclusion of the annual
Fe´de´ration internationale de droit europe´en (F.I.D.E.) Congress in June of 2003,
Chairman of the European Policy Centre and member of the Advisory Board of the
Centre for European Reform Peter Sutherland noted that the use of the word
‘constitution’ was alone enough to prevent people from supporting the Treaty. [22]
After all, even for those who are not schooled in government, law or politics,
‘constitution’ sounds like something that forms the organisational structure for one’s
state—the state. And if that state is called ‘Europe’, then it looks like a superstate that by
simple analogy must be intended to be the place where all the power will be that formerly
would have been in London, Stockholm, or Copenhagen. Even the name of the document
that did pass—‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’—dares not to be so bold
as to call the thing simply a ‘constitution’. If one doubts the impact of the name, then one
might well be reminded that in Germany, after World War II, the most fundamental law,
referred to colloquially as a constitution was in fact called a Grundgesetz (basic law), as a
political statement against recognising a completely constituted Germany without those
states occupied by the Soviet Union. Of note is the fact that in German, as in English, the
word Verfassung (constitution) just as easily connotes composition. Thus the shared
connotative resonance in these specific sister languages is worthy of note, as has been so
poetically explained by Seamus Heaney in the introduction to his translation of Beowulf,
wherein he expounds on the usages of ‘so’ in both its Saxon roots and Northern Irish
usage [13].1 The Society’s word for 2005 had not yet been chosen at the time of this writing.
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Although I am focusing upon just one word here, the broader question that I am raising
is how much impact upon our thinking about the futures of Europe that one word has as an
example of the constitutive nature of language. Even the natural sciences do not escape
questions concerning the degree to which human activity is constituted by language.
Indeed for some historians of science [24], philosophers of science [21], rhetoricians of
science [12], sociologists of science [1] and practitioners of science [19], the primary
question that must be answered regarding the relationship of language to science is:
‘Is language constitutive of science?’ For these people, there are varying degrees of
interest and relevance to other questions regarding the relationship of language to sciences.
For historians or sociologists, the connexion may be extremely important at the level of
their practices, which are obviously and essentially textual practices, but even then, the
connection may be one of practical utility. The connexion may even be what some would
call derivative or second order, because, says the scientist, the scientist is working with
material nature, not words about material nature. (This position fails to address what
‘working with’ in fact is, however.) If practicing scientists can be said to be represented by
such practitioners as former chair of the UK’s Committee on the Public Understanding of
Science (C.O.P.U.S.), Lewis Wolpert, who claims to speak for scientists, then it would
seem that for practicing scientists language has nothing to do with science [27].
Even the rhetorician of science, in all but his most radical form is likely to be willing to
acknowledge that when it comes to language and science, while language may constitute
many of the scientists’ practices, even as Latour and Woolgar have noted with their lasting
work on inscription devices and practices, Laboratory Life [17], there comes a point at
which the material world may ineloquently remain reluctant to behave in such a way that
could be said to be constituted by any language practice. Borrowing from Kenneth Burke’s
ideas on recalcitrance, McGuire and Melia call this position one of ‘minimal realism’ [18].
My own position, based in rhetoric, borrows from several points made by the philosopher
Martin Heidegger when he says such things as die Welt weltet (‘the world worlds’) and die
Sprache spricht (‘language languages’) [14]. When the material world is doing its own
thing, that is, ‘worlding’, it is admittedly an extra-linguistic doing. And when language is
doing its own doing—that is, ‘languaging’—it is a practice that is not limited to
representations of the material world.
Regarding Heidegger’s provocations, one should notice that he does not say ‘language
only languages but the material world worlds’ or some such statement privileging the
material world. In fact, a review of his work fails to find any comparative conclusions of
the two separate statements at all. In the end, there remains space in the Heideggerian
formulations, as regards language and science, to say that while language does not
constitute the material world, we cannot say and, therefore, know anything meaningful
about the material world, until we comport ourselves to it through language. This position
echoes one of the remaining fragments of Gorgias from twenty-five centuries ago. In that
fragment, known to us as On Nature, Gorgias posits three possible natures of truth, the last
of which hangs heavily upon the relationship of language to truth: first there simply is no
truth, second there is truth but we cannot know it, and third there is truth, we can know it,
but we cannot communicate it [11]. Obviously, there would be many who disagree with
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or any of the other hypotheses mentioned above. The point is to explore the breadth and
nature of the relationship we mean, in English, when we ask whether one thing constitutes
something else.
The first connotation that one commonly encounters today is the legal one. In fact it is
such a common connotation, that it has the traits of Nietzsche’s image-less coin—worn out
and without sensuous power, having lost its image and functioning only as metal, not as a
coin [20]. The image-less coin now falls so disproportionately often into the legal slot that
we have developed a sense that the denotation of ‘constitution’ must be its legal one. This is
not surprising if one reflects upon the linguistic nature of law practice and the number of
lawyers in English speaking cultures, not to mention the trend toward understanding law
always through constitutional issues [9], then of course the greatest frequency for saying or
writing ‘constitution’ will be law-related—hence the worn-out slot and the imageless coin.
Moreover, even within the legal connotation, an irrefutable element of materialism has
taken over. One hears the statement for instance the ‘the United Kingdom has no
constitution’ because there is not a single document with the word ‘constitution’ across the
top of the front page. Even legally-educated persons make the false statement that ‘the
United Kingdom has no written constitution’. There is in fact a constitution for the United
Kingdom, and its nature can be induced from written documents like the Magna Carta, the
Petition of Rights, the Bill of Rights, the Acts of Settlement, and the Human Rights Act,
but it is not written in one place nor is there a single document entitled ‘constitution’ from
which one may deduce the rule of law in a particular matter. Nor should the lack of a single
document entailing all legal relationships be taken to be a sign that a society is not in some
way constituted. Indeed, attempting to reduce the constitution of a society to one
document has its own problems. ‘The limits of human foresight guarantee the eventual
failure of any constitutional document as an ordering principle of political experience.
And insofar as emergencies expose those limits, they demonstrate the ultimate
contingency of all constitutional orders’. [28: p. 5]
One could indeed make the argument that Europe, as a legal entity of some sort, prior to
the June, 2004 Dublin Treaty, had a constitution in a very similar way to that of the United
Kingdom, but that the thought process necessary to induce a constitution from the acquis
communautaire did not sit as comfortably with continental thinking as the thought process
does with the British in inducing a constitution from the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights,
the Acts of Settlement and so forth. Of course if one were to embark on the rather lengthy
task of weighing how much legislation currently puts social, economic, environmental or
employment programs into place in the member states of Europe either through the
indirect European legislative tool of directives, or directly through regulations, one may be
shocked to see that one’s life is impacted already in so many places and ways not by
domestic legislation, but by those same people who threatened to create a constitution.
That legislation, which together with the constitutive treaties is known as the acquis
communautaire, need not contain a document called a ‘constitution’ to indeed already
constitute Europe in its legal sense.
In either case, it would take some thinking and examining by a reader to determine what
that constitution is, rather than dismissively pointing to a document labelled ‘constitution’.
But with that exercise, one might well come to better understand what it is to say that
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have liberated thinking for considering other connotations for the word ‘constitution’.
There are of course the connotations of constitution that are concerned with body type and
even the connection of body type with one’s personality or spirit. These connotations
would seem to move the focus more in the direction of ‘incorporation’ or ‘embody’,
however. Likewise, one can reconstitute food products, for instance, by re-storing a
necessary ingredient, such as water, thereby giving the product body once again.
And so it remains that when one asks ‘what constitutes what?’ one returns to examining
what it means ‘to constitute’. From there, one can move somewhat laterally to the worn
slot of ‘constitution’ and see if we can sharpen the edges a bit in order to bring our
linguistic practices to consciousness and break out of one cell at least, even if we remain in
Jameson’s prisonhouse of language [16].3. States in the mirror and unions through the windscreen
If one were to reflect upon the history of governmental organisations, it would appear
likely that at some point in time, the organisation of persons that we know as the ‘nation-
state‘ or Staat will likely cease to exist [15]. Marshall McLuhan warned us that although
we are all in the driver seat, we are looking in the rear-view mirror and consequently going
backwards into the future.2 If we are looking through the rear-view mirror, on the distant
horizon we might see vestiges of governmental forms that we called ‘holy empires’,
‘empires’ in general, or pure ‘monarchies’. (While indeed some monarchies still exist,
they typically do so in some modified form, as with a presidential or constitutional
monarchy.) If we look in that same rear-view mirror to the more immediate horizon, we
would see nation-states.
If, on the other hand, we were looking through the windscreen, rather than through the
rear-view mirror, what would we see? We would see unions, not states. We would see the
United Nations, the European Union, the new African Union, the Caribbean Community,
and the World Trade Organisation. True, these unions seem to stretch out to us from far in
the future, but we are heading in their direction, and like it or not, they have already begun
to arrive. Insofar as these new forms and institutions of governance have not come into
being as slate-clearing revolutions or clear-cutting shopping mall developments—and will
not do so—we must consider them as being on the horizon in front of us.3 The movement
is from a world organised publicly by nation states, to one organised in other ways.
In between, that period in which we have been living for at least 50 years, is characterised
by living through the change; the change from nation states to unions, confederations and
even federations that are constituted by nation states.2 According to McLuhan Associates, Ltd, his statement was ‘We look at the present through a rear-view mirror.
We march backwards into the future’. Copyright q 1986, McLuhan Associates, Ltd, http://www.
marshallmcluhan.com/poster.html, accessed March 23, 2004.
3 Here it is worth noting that the idea that the future is in front of us and the past behind us is itself a function of
our times. To the language of classic Roman civilization, the reverse would have been the case.
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constituted by their own powers, leaving the individual person (the legal object)
completely without mention. Gradually, the individual’s rights gathered importance over
and against the government’s powers, and were made explicit in legal documents called
‘constitutions’. In the more than 400 paragraphs of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe, the catalogue of citizens’ rights is repeated in two separate places, in fact.
Yet the focus here is on the word ‘constitution’, not the thing. In structuralist terms, that
would be the symbol, not the referent. It is a concern that has resonances with literary critic
Kenneth Burke in his often-cited Grammar of Motives, which one should note began with
a prolonged consideration of constitutions, and appropriate to the present discussion, a
work in which he dwells largely in a discussion of the legal sense of constituting [3].
‘Strictly speaking, we mean by a grammar of motives a concern with the terms alone,
without reference to the ways in which their potentialities have been or can be utilized in
actual statements about motives’ [3: p. xvi]. But my concerns are more akin to deriving
meaning from usage, as does Raymond Williams in Keywords, or as does the inspiration
for Williams’ form in Keywords, the Oxford English Dictionary [26].
Being concerned with the word ‘constitution’ means that one must look at how it is
used as a word. As we are reminded each year when it selects its ‘man of the year’, Time
magazine says it is selecting someone whose impact has been the greatest, whether
positively or negatively. Hence Time selected Adolf Hitler (1938) and Josef Stalin (1939
and 1942) and defended its selection of George W. Bush in 2004 as being non-partisan.4. Linguistic atomism (also known as ‘definition’)
Too often one is tempted to begin thinking about a word by defining it. With definition
itself, there is already the need, however, to understand its function as social invention,
rather than as an ontological statement about the word or its referent. Definition, practiced
as linguistic atomism, is found among the common topoi in the discovery of arguments,
presented in that same Greek culture in which material atomism made its mark. As such, it
is not the final or most basic one, but rather just one of many topoi [5]. ‘Defining is a basic
mode of discourse. As such, Definition is one of the Topics of Invention, serving as a
common method for developing or supporting an argument. Even if definition is not
employed to support a main point or develop the section of a speech, many figures are
based on some kind of definition’ [4].
The appeal to definition is an appeal to a cultural sense; a cultural enthymeme,
dependent upon cultural learning (said in a positive way) or bias (said in a negative
way). We take the notions that ideas can be expressed in words, and to a greater degree
that words can be understood by reducing them to other words (definition) as though it
is some sort of natural process, or even common sense. This linguistic relation to ideas
is a linguistic manifestation of atomism, much as we have seen it since Democritis in
the natural sciences. Approximately 100 years ago, Ferdinand de Saussure launched
linguistic structuralism by pointing out that the meaning of words is not determined by
the material things to which we relate the words. While structuralism as a movement
may no longer be fashionable, even among those who are post-structuralist, some of the
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understanding the workings of language. “The relationship of the signifier to the
signified is arbitrary” Saussure wrote [6]. Defining words is a matter of taking the
infinity of meanings and making it finite to correspond with a specific utterance or ink
squiggle on a piece of paper. Thus, we learn the meaning of a word by distinguishing it
from what it is not. Even without the nuances of poststructuralism or deconstruction, the
immediate message of Saussure’s structuralism here would be to note that the
phenomenon of language is explained by words relating to ideas, not things, and the
non-linguistic idea then in turn is related to the thing; a multilinear structure of three
moments, not a unilinear structure of two moments. If one thinks long enough about
definition this way—the process of making finite what is infinite—one may see that it
results in circular reasoning: x is defined as y, y as z, z as a, a as b all the way back to x.
It is a micro hermeneutic circle of interpretations.
An alternative sense of definition is to think of it as the drawing of a Venn diagram
circle around the meaning and separating the finite from the infinite [6]. Nearly 100 years
after Saussure, this emphasis upon what a thing is not was successfully applied to teach
computers natural language. In September of 2003, the German weekly magazine Der
Spiegel reported that a German researcher in California had created something of a furore
when he was able to ‘teach’ natural languages to a computer in record time. His secret was
to let the computer run through the thousands of usages of one word with another to learn
how to distinguish the newly-acquired word [7]. Six years earlier, during a plenary address
to those in attendance at the American Association of the Advancement of Science in
Seattle, Washington in 1997, guest speaker Bill Gates told that audience that his
company’s researchers had recognized that computers need context to recognize speech
just like humans do. As an example, the speech group at Microsoft is called ‘Wreck A Nice
Beach’ because without context, those words could be phonetically understood as
‘Recognise Speech’ [10].
Having recognised the historical basis and social contingencies of definition, in
consideration of definition one then faces the distinction of inductive from deductive
thought once again. When an English speaker explores the history of definition as a topus
related to invention, he or she might compare the different figures used to support
definition through the inductive method of etymological context, in the way that the
Oxford English Dictionary does or in which Raymond Williams does in his Keywords. By
contrast, one may compare the atomistic deduction that occurs in a desktop lexicon that
defines a word by breaking it down into its constituent parts. In the former, meaning is
based upon usage, just as meaning in the common law is based upon usage, or as the truth
of one’s belief is based upon experience in philosophic empiricism. In the latter, meaning
is based upon a covering model or rule of meaning for the word, just as the civil law relies
far more upon the application of a covering law to a case to determine justice, or as when
the truth of one’s belief is based upon a priori reasoning in philosophic rationalism.
And so one needs to ask what ‘constitute’ is not, in order to see what it is. As noted, a
piece of paper with the word ‘constitution’ is not necessary for something to be
constituted. And we know that nations may constitute states, or a multiplicity of nations
may constitute states, or even less than a complete nation could constitute a state. So the
nation is not necessary either in order to understand how a state is constituted.
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One need not invent a new application of the usages of linguistic constitution in
order to arrive at meanings for the constitution of Europe. Focusing as he did on the
British constitution in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, Edmund Burke re-
inserted ‘constitute’ into ‘constitution’.[2] Picking up not only on the message of Burke,
but on his spirit as well, in When Words Lose Their Meaning, James Boyd White tells
us first how communities are linguistically constituted, and second how linguistic
constitution is legal constitution [25]. In reflecting upon the word ‘constitution’,
Edmund Burkeoffers his reader a ‘British Constitution’ that is at once a version of the world that is
England and a way of maintaining and improving it, since for him ‘constitution’ has
the force not only of a noun but of a verb: it is a structure of relations that includes
the method of its own change, an activity in which we all engage. And since this
activity is necessarily individual in character, the ‘British Constitution’ of which
Burke writes, and which he wishes to improve and to perpetuate, is in its deepest
form internal (as well as external) to the reader; it is a way of making and remaking
identity and community through language. [25: pp. 218–219]
How is identity and community constituted through language? One way is through
the medium of the law. For Edmund Burke, the law ‘is the constitution of a world by
the distribution of authority within it; it establishes the terms on which its actors may
talk in conflict or cooperation among themselves’ [25: pp. 266–267]. Moreover, ‘for
Burke, civilization is a kind of art, for it involves, as he repeatedly says, the
‘composition’ or ‘constitituion ‘ of a world out of preexisting ‘materials’; but it is an art
of a remarkable kind, for the composition affects, as we have seen, both the human and
physical materials of which it is made.. The activity of ‘constitution’ is conversational
and imaginative and difficult and creative, a kind of cultural art; it takes place within the
individual, in his relations with others—in his friendships—and in his relation to his
culture’ [25: pp. 229–230].
The connection of Edmund Burke’s motivation to justify the constitution of Britain is
not so far removed from the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe as it may
appear to be at first glance. According to White, Edmund Burke says of the British
Constitution ‘that it achieves a remarkable ‘unity’ amidst enormous ‘diversity’ [25: p.
208]. This ‘unity among diversity’ is precisely the theme then picked up by the EU for
the intergovernmental discussions of the European constitution [23]. Specifically, the
preamble contains the following passage:Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history,
the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united
ever more closely, to forge a common destiny, convinced that, thus ‘united in its
diversity’, Europe offers them the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the
rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future
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human hope [8].
Edmund Burke recognises the limits of such a formulation of community and identity
through the language of the law, however. As White emphasises, ‘There have been many
elegant and coherent ‘constitutions’—like the French Constitution described by Burke—
which in the event came to nothing. What matters is always what place, if any, such an
instrument will have in the lives of those it is intended to regulate’ [25: p. 245].6. Conclusion
Is to constitute to define? If so, who is permitted to do the defining act; that is to make
finite that which had been infinite? In the social sciences, it is typically frowned upon to
use self-reporting alone as one’s information source unless one has some tested
interpretive framework in place. The European invaders took fewer than 200 years to
constitute North and South America as ‘European’. The process just happened to be during
a 200 years period of relatively fluid travel and communication, aided by industrial
expansion. Transportation, communication and open government have speeded the
process of constituting Europe. Hence in North America in a land mass and population
relatively the same size as Europe, one is more likely first self-described as a ‘Canadian’ or
‘(U.S.) American’ than as an ‘Ontarian’ or a ‘North Dakotan’. What framework might one
put in place to determine the reliability of these self-definitions? Is there another
corroborating way to determine if in fact these people really are ‘Europeans’ instead of
Portuguese or Greeks? This seems to have fuelled the sometimes frighteningly xenophobic
debate regarding race, religion and geography that began with the latest and largest
expansion, and continues with the enduring talks about and with Turkey.
Looking forward to futures for Europe, then, one must consider that the form of the
state will not permanently be the way by which we know that we are constituted. The state
in fact may be added to the list of things on the outside of the Venn diagram ring fence, and
be included among those things by which people make their identity finite by saying what
they are not. The issue before us is the reverse of that which White analyses from Edmund
Burke. There, White’s analysis skilfully demonstrates the constitutive nature of language
for law. But with the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, one needs to reverse
the timeline to attempt the analysis. The Treaty (or constitution, if one sees fit to call it
that) is here. Now the nations legally bound by the document must examine what it means
not only to constitute ‘Europe’ legally, but in doing so, as does White, so see how the
languages of Europe constitute the community of Europe. In the end, all that may
synthesise a Europe that agrees to be ‘united in diversity’ are the legal and political
institutions of the Union itself. But even if that is the case, one might well inform the
understanding of what that means not in the technocratic sense of legislated rules backed
by economic sanctions, but rather in the ways in which language constitutes the law, and in
turn, law the institutions of the Union.
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